By John Tweeddale

    Tuesday, February 13, 2007

    Review essay on Muller's PRRD

    Here is my review I wrote for The Shepherd's Scrapbook, "Mulling over Muller: A Casual Tour Through Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics."

    Friday, November 10, 2006

    Question of Central Dogma: PRRD 1:123-132

    2.5 Reformed Orthodoxy and the Idea of “Central Dogmas” (123-132)

    A. The Problem of Presuppositions: Prolegomena and Principia vs. Central Dogmas (123-125)

    1. Rationalism, predestinarianism, and determinism in the seventeenth century – a distinction of issues (123-125)

    In this section, Muller is concerned with two questions often raised by scholars about Reformed orthodoxy: 1) is it a predestinarian system, and is it a form of rationalism? If answered in the affirmative, then the Protestant scholastics of the seventeenth century would stand in stark discontinuity with the Reformers. Therefore, Muller states, “The identification of Reformed orthodoxy as [sic] a movement in continuity with the Reformation, and therefore, as the historical link between the Reformation and modern forms of confessionally identifiable Reformed thought depends, therefore, in no small measure, on our ability to answer both of these questions in the negative” (123).

    2. Central dogmas and the methods of seventeenth century (125)

    One way to answer these questions is to examine to the treatises on theological prolegomena developed by the Reformed orthodox. For here we find the controlling presuppositions and principles of their theology given in their own words. These works evidence two fundamental principia for theology: Scripture and God. Far from a predestination-centered or rationalistic driven theology, we find a theology that is logically arranged but on the basis of exegetical principles and within a traditional catholic framework.

    B. The “Principles of Reformed Orthodoxy” (125-132)

    1. Predestination and the principia (125-129)

    The attempt to describe Protestant scholasticism as the systematic development of central dogmas or controlling principles – predestination in the case of the Reformed, justification in the case of the Lutherans – was, at best, a theological reinterpretation of the Protestant scholastic systems based on the efforts of constructive theologians of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to rebuilt theological system in the wake of the Kantian critique of rational metaphysics…At worst, the central dogma theories are an abuse of history that cannot stand in the light of a careful reading of the sources” (125-125). Ouch!

    The doctrine of predestination is not considered as a organizing principle of theology (locus de theologia) in any of the orthodox systems. Nor is it considered as a foundation of theology (principium theologiae) or fundamental article of the faith (articulus fundamentalis). Rather, the Reformed orthodox affirmed two fundamental principles for the development of theological system: foundation of knowing (principium cognoscendi) and the foundation of being (principium essendi). The former is Scripture and the latter is God. Like Augustine and Aquinas before them, the Reformed orthodox considered predestination as a subordinate category to the doctrine of God (principium essendi) and not as the controlling doctrine of theology.

    2. Althaus, Heppe, and Schweizer on prolegomena: specific critiques (129-132)

    In this section, Muller examines the important works of Althaus, Heppe, and Schweizer. His critique is essentially the same. Each at some level assumes predestination as a central dogma and fails to do justice to the sources.

    Monday, October 16, 2006

    Reformed Orthodox Prolegomena: PRRD I.108-122

    2.4 Theological Prolegomena in Reformed Orthodoxy (108-122)

    A. The Transition to Early Orthodoxy and the First Reformed Prolegomena (108-117)

    1. The nature of the transition (108-110)

    While the basic elements of theological method were present in the Reformers, they did not produce a fully developed prolegomena. That task fell upon Protestants in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century with the movement towards institutionalization. The construction of a prolegomena had at least three components: 1) stating the views of the theological task as expressed by previous Reformers, 2) the ‘appropriation and modification of the earlier tradition of prolegomena’, and 3) the polemical defense of Protestant principles and presuppositions against Roman Catholic criticism.

    Muller contends, “The theological prolegomena of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are, arguably, the most exhaustive and most finely tooled prolegomena in this history of theology…Without exaggeration, the theological prolegomena of the seventeenth-century Protestant scholastics provide a model for the development of a distinctively Protestant but nonetheless universally Christian or catholic theology – a model that Protestant theology today can ignore only at great risk” (109).

    2. Elements of prolegomena: from Ursinus to Perkins and Lubbertus (ca. 1563 to 1591) (110-113)

    Ursinus – in his posthumous work Doctrinae christianae compendium he briefly notes three aspects of the study of theology: 1) catechetical instruction, 2) development of commonplaces (loci communes), and 3) meditation on Scripture.

    NB: During the early orthodox period, the locus method developed by Melanchthon and modified by Musculus, Calvin, and Vermigli was the predominate model for theological discourse.

    Zanchi – in his Praefatiuncula in locos communos was one of the first to attempt a prolegomena. Following Zabarella, there are two principal methods of teaching theology: 1) “the synthetic or ‘compositive’ method is properly employed in the binding together and teaching of theological loci"; and 2) “the analytic or ‘resolutive’ method is properly applied to the explication of Scripture.” (111).

    Benedict Aretius (successor to Musculus in Bern) – his work Theologia problemata (1573) has an extended discussion on the difference between natural theology as the ‘fruit of gentle philosophy’ and theology which is based on revelation. See also his brief Examen theologicum (1557).

    Lambert Daneau (Genevan trained and contemporary of Aretius) – his work Christianae isagoges (1583) begins uncharacteristically with the doctrine of God (as opposed to the doctrine of Scripture) and his shorter Compendium (1595) begins with a brief ‘prolegomenon.’

    Stephanus Szegedinus – his Theologiae sincerae loci communes de Deo et Homine (1585) is “perhaps the first major thoroughly Ramist model found in a Reformed dogmatics of the era” (112).

    Antoine Chandieu – in De verbo Dei scripto (1580) he “proposed explicitly a program for Protestant Scholasticism” due to the need to engage Roman Catholics in scholastic debate (112).

    Petrus RamusDe religione christiana (1576) is remembered for setting forth the memorable definition of theology as the ‘doctrine of living well’ before God.

    Dudley FennerSacra theologia (1585) offers discussion on covenant theology and a brief chapter on De theologia.

    William PerkinsArmilla aurea (1591 – A Golden Chain) while focusing on the order of salvation states that theology is ‘the science of living blessedly for ever’ (notice the echo of Ramus), emphasizing the practical side of theology.

    Sibrandus Lubbertus – with his De principiis (1591), “Lubbertus provided Reformed theology, at the beginning of the formulation of its prolegomena, with the identification of Scripture as the principium in the dogmatic sense of the term” (113).

    3. Junius, Polanus, and the development of early orthodox prolegomena (113-117)

    Franciscus JuniusDe vera thelogia (1594) is the most important work of theological prolegomena in the early orthodox period. He introduced a definition of theology as discipline, the ectypal/archetypal distinction, and manifests the Protestant move away from viewing theology as scientia towards theology as sapientia.

    Amandu PolanusPartitiones theologiae and Syntagma theologiaw christianae (1609) are dependent on Junius. The Syntagma is “surely the most elaborate dogmatic system produced by a Reformed theologian up to that point” (115).

    Other works: Gerhard’s Loci theologici (1610) was the standard Lutheran work, Alsted’s Methodus sacrocanctae theologiae (1614) shows reliance upon Junius and Polanus. In the works of Perkins, Ames, Stoughton and Trelcatius, Wollebius, and Waleaus, we see a focus upon theology as theologia nostra (our theology).

    B. Developments in High and Late Orthodoxy (117-122)

    1. High orthodoxy writers and issues (117-121)

    Whereas it is characteristic of the early orthodox prolegomena to reflect intellectual ties to thinkers like Calvin, Musculus, and Vermigli through extended discussion of the problem of natural theology, the high orthodox prolegomena tend to accept the results of earlier discussion and to treat the issue in brief definitions. By way of further contrast, the high orthodox shift focus of the discussion of the natural powers of mind to the extended treatment of the relation of philosophy to theology and the function of reason in theology. This latter change can be accounted for in no small measure by the successful institutionalization of Protestantism and the identification of theology as an academic discipline in dialogue with philosophy” (118-119).

    2. From Reformation to orthodoxy: continuity and development through the high orthodox era (121-122)

    The Protestant scholastic prolegomena look back to medieval models – in the absence of clear statements of presuppositions and definitions by the Reformers – but do so in the context of an already established Protestant theological tradition as embodied in confessional norms” (121).

    3. Alterations in the prolegomena of the late orthodox era (122) – the rise of rationalism.

    Monday, October 09, 2006

    Reformation Prolegomena: PRRD I.96-108

    2.3 The Reformation and Its Theological Presuppositions (96-108)

    A. Roots of the Reformation and the Early Reformers (96-103)

    1. Reformation and issues of prolegomena: the case of Luther (96-99)

    The theology of the Reformation, in its doctrinal statements and in its presuppositions, stands as both the rejection of the late medieval theological world and as a direct outgrowth of that world, dependent in large measure upon the medieval science of theology for insight into the nature of the theological task” (96-97).

    We must remember that while the Reformation sought to reformulate individual doctrines such as justification, it maintained many of the theological formulations of western Trinitarian orthodoxy and thoroughgoing Augustinianism. Muller points to at least two developments that can be traced back to the Luther. The first concerns the Protestant doctrine of Scripture. Before the Reformation, a scripture principle was operative in the early and medieval church but not a formal doctrine of Scripture had developed. Muller contends that the development of an orthodox doctrine of Scripture can be traced back to Luther’s famous statement at the Diet of Worms in 1521 where the fallibility of human authority and the Bible as the ground for theology were clearly affirmed. A scripture revolution was born.

    Another development Muller points to is Luther’s division between a theology of glory (theologia gloriae) and a theology of cross (theologia crucis) in the Heidelberg Disputation. With a measure of disgust for early scholastic and Aristotelian approaches to theology, Luther gleaned from Scotist and nominalists thought ‘a sense of the rift between theology in itself and theology in fact – the epistemological restriction of the theologia viatorum – but radically altered it’ (99). In this distinction Muller finds the ‘proximate source’ of Calvin’s twofold knowledge of God.

    2. Melanchthon and theological prolegomena (100-102)

    Contrary to Luther’s somewhat ‘nonsystematic’ approach to theology, Melanchthon provides a more positive take on theological method in the prefaces to the various editions of his Loci Communes (1521) and in his discussion on the doctrine of God. For example, he notes that way of theology (methodus theologiae) must be organized according to the scripturae series (God, sin, redemption, law, promise, etc) and that the historic creeds provide ‘architectonic models for theological system’ (100).

    In his essays Brevis discendae theologiae ratio (c. 1530), Melanchthon outlines a plan for biblical study which begins with Romans and moves into the epistles and Gospels (ending with John) and ending with reading the Old Testament. For Melanchthon, Scripture was the foundation for theology. Thus Muller concludes, “Melanchthon’s Loci communes prepared the way, from a methodological perspective, for the fundamentally biblical and exegetical model, centered on the message of Romans, that became one of the most significant for both Lutheran and Reformed dogmatics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that establishes a fundamental point of distinction between the method of Protestant theology and the method of the medieval commentators on the Sentences” (101).

    3. The contributions of Zwingli and Bucer (102-103)

    Both Zwingli (in his De vera et falsa religione commentarius, 1524) and Bucer (in his Summarischer Vergiff, 1548) address on the most important issues of prolegomena: the effects of sin on the knowledge of God.

    B. Presuppositions and Principles in the Era of Calvin and His Contemporaries (103-108)

    1. Calvin and Viret (103-105)

    The successive editions of Calvin’s Institutes from 1536 to 1559 change from a catechetical manual to a summary of Christian life and doctrine. In earlier editions (from 1543-1550) topics were arranged in large part according to loci extrapolated from Romans in the Melanchthon manner. In the final edition Calvin structured his work roughly according to the Apostles’ Creed but included the important theme of his duplex cognitio Dei (Knowledge of God the Creator and Knowledge of God the Redeemer). But even more than Calvin’s Institutes, the Loci communes by Vermigli-Massonius and Musculus clearly delineate a locus method of theological organisation and set the agenda for the future of orthodox structuring of theology. Another important character is Lausanne Reformer Pierre Viret. Although not as popular or well-know as Calvin, Vermigli, and Musculus, he wrote in a more popular, vernacular style.

    2. Vermigli and Musculus (105-107)

    Musculus provides further insight into the early Reformed contribution to theological prolegomena. Like Calvin and Vermigli, he manifests an epistemological concern, and more like Vermigli than Calvin, he notes a certain philosophical and theological complexity to the problem of natural knowledge of God” (107).

    3. Hyperius (107-108)

    His posthumous work Methodi theologiae (1568) is the only second generation Reformation writing to produce a ‘formal, methodological prolegomenon’ and provide a clear rationale for theological system and organization.

    Muller makes the following conclusions:

    1. Early Protestant reflection upon theological prolegomena did not completely establish a uniform method for organizing a theological system.

    2. Early Protestant reflection upon theological prolegomena does anticipate later developments by the Reformed orthodox.

    3. Early Protestant reflection upon theological prolegomena provides ‘a useful gauge’ of the development of Reformed orthodoxy and its continuity with the Reformation.

    4. The greatest contribution of the early Reformation to theological prolegomena was its reflection upon the problem of knowledge of God and human finitude and sin.

    Monday, October 02, 2006

    Medieval Prolegomena: PRRD I.88-96

    2.2 Medieval Prolegomena (88-96)

    A. The Beginnings of Prolegomena: Early Scholastic Developments (88-90)

    The development of Protestant theological system did not occur in a vacuum. The process was complex. Instead of creating an entire new system and language to articulate their insights, the Reformers utilized and modified elements of extant theological systems available to them – particularly from the middle to late Middle Ages.

    The development of a formal theological methodology can be traced to mid-twelfth century theologians such as Hugh of St Victor (d. 1141), Gilbert de la Porrée (d. 1154), Peter Lombard (d. 1160), and Alain of Lille (d. 1202) who saw the need to organise a consist approach to the theological task if it was to be effectively taught in the schools.

    In his work De sacramentis christianae fidei, Hugh affirms that Scripture (and the correct interpretation of it) is the foundation of theology. More specifically, he locates the task of theology within the realms of creation (opus conditionis) and redemption (opus restaurationis). What is significant about this point is that “it defines the object of the discipline as practical and redemptive rather than speculative and metaphysical” (89).

    Gilbert and Alain play important parts in the formation of theological prolegomena – perhaps more than Hugh and Lombard – as they were among the first in history to outline rules for theological method. Additionally, both were keen to establish the rules of argument, place theology within the category of academic disciplines, and identify theology as a scientia.

    Lombard is significant in that his Sententiae became the standard medieval theological textbook. His method of presenting an issue or question, providing relevant biblical and patristic sources, and stating a response became the model of scholastic argumentation. Subsequently, this work was gathered (perhaps by Alexander of Hales at the University of Paris) into four basic books: 1) God; 2) creation, sin, and free will; 3) incarnation, Christ’s person and work, Christian graces and virtues; and 4) sacraments and last things. These categories formulated the pattern for theological system.

    B. The High Scholastic Development: The Thirteenth-Century Flowering of Method (90-94)

    1. Issues faced the thirteenth-century theologians (90-91)

    With the interest of Aristotelian metaphysics and ethics (and not just his logic) in the thirteenth century, the employment of the term scientia with reference to theology took on new meaning. Like all sciences, theology was in need of its own self-evident, first principles (principia per se nota) to provide the necessary foundation for argumentation, classification, clarification, and instruction. Discussions relating to the difference between scientia (knowledge) and sapientia (wisdom) also developed during this period.

    2. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas (91-93)

    Franciscans such as Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) and Bonaventure (d. 1274) insisted that theology was not chiefly speculative but affective, experiential, and moral in character. Whereas, the “step of defining the character of theological scientia among other sciences was taken by Thomas Aquinas, who joined the concept of theology as a ratiocinative discipline characterized by definition and division of the subject for purposes of debate to the Aristotelian concepts of scientia and scientia subalterna” (92).

    3. Henry of Ghent (93-94)

    The great codifier of thirteenth-century theorization on the presuppositions of theological system just prior to the intense critique launched by Scotus and the nominalists was Henry of Ghent (d. 1293)” (93).

    C. Late Medieval Developments and Critique (94-96)

    1. Duns Scotus and the problem of theological scientia (94-95)

    Scotus’s radical dichotomization of faith and reason represents a major departure from the work of Alexander and Bonaventure on the one hand and Aquinas on the other. Theology, for Scotus, was principally a practical discipline (i.e. praxis) and operated upon the presupposition of the “incapacity of the finite for the infinite” (94). Therefore, the theological task is concerned more with our limited knowledge of our (theologia nostra) instead of divine self-knowledge (theologia in se).

    2. Ockam and further alterations of the discipline of theology (95-96)

    Regarding the nature of scientia, Ockam distinguished between a broad and narrow definition. Broadly speaking, science is “the certain knowledge of any truth” and narrowly considered it is an “evident knowledge of necessary truths” (e.g. knowledge by syllogistic demonstration). Since theology by definition rests of faith, the term science can only be applied in the broader sense.

    These shifting patterns in theological prolegomena paved the way for use of scholastic methods in the Reformation. Muller concludes, “we need to recognize that many of the pressures toward change leading to the development of new patterns of argument and presentation – such as the organization of dogmatics by locus – in Protestant theological system were pressures universally felt and also of importance to the development of Roman Catholic theology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries…The new methodology, with its concentration of loci in Scripture and tradition as material sources of theology, had significant impact on the later Middle Ages and Renaissance and, in the hands of early Reformers like Melanchthon, would transform the method of classroom and, therefore, the scholastic exercise” (96).

    Thursday, September 21, 2006

    PRRD I.85-87

    Chapter 2 – The Development of Theological Prolegomena (85-146)

    2.1 Presuppositions, Principles, and Prolegomena (85-87)

    A. Setting the Stage after the Production – on the Construction of Prolegomena (85-86)

    While all theology and theological statements rest upon presuppositions and principles, the ‘explicit explanation of those presuppositions and principles, however, is one of the last tasks undertaken in the historical development of theological system’ (85). It was not until medieval theology (e.g. with the development of sententiae) and Protestant orthodoxy that questions concerning theological system emerge.

    Although theological prolegomena is a relatively late historical phenomenon, the issues addressed by this discipline have always impacted the task of theology. ‘The production of any theological formula brings with it fundamental questions of relationship of language to divine truth, of the capability of any human statement to bear the weight of revelation, and of the relationship of statements concerning God to grammatically identical statements concerning the world of sense and experience’ (86).

    And who says analytic theology is only for sophisticated postmoderns?

    B. Prolegomena and Theology: Some Basic Relationships (86-87).

    Otto Weber made the observation that when prolegomena rests on ‘nontheological, ontological, or anthropological presuppositions’ it is predogmatic (vordogmatisch). Technically, Weber contends, Christian dogmatics can have no prolegomena, but rather only an introduction which ‘shares in the presuppositions of the system of dogmatics as a whole’ (86).

    This can be illustrated by examining the emergence of Protestant orthodox prolegomena. First, historically speaking, prolegomena arouse out of Protestant reflection upon a received theological heritage. The fundamental questions and principles discussed in theological prolegomena share the same theological presuppositions of the system of doctrine of Protestant orthodoxy as a whole. ‘Reformed orthodoxy was not a deductive system…but a topical theology that arose out of extended meditation on and defense of its varied loci’ (87).

    Second, Protestant orthodox prolegomena evidences a clear commitment to the primacy of exegesis. In other words, the task of prolegomena is not pretheological, for the same Scripture principle normative for Reformed dogmatics is operative for Reformed prolegomena. Additionally, the themes and basic distinctions of the prolegomena (e.g. archtypal and ectypal theology, theology before and after the fall, etc) are a reflection of the theological system as a whole.

    Friday, February 17, 2006

    PRRD I.60-84

    [This section is rather long and technical. So I’ve tried to simplify Muller’s argument; however, this means I’ve flattened the nuance of many of his points and omitted several references to key works and thinkers. Even when trying to hit the highlights, I found my summaries to be somewhat involved and complicated. Hopefully, things will start to pick up. The goal is still all 4 volumes! Am I being too optimistic?]

    1.3 The Rise of Orthodoxy and the Structures of Protestant Scholastic Theology (60-84)

    A. Doctrine and Method in the Era of Early Orthodoxy (ca. 1565-1618) (60-73)

    1. Continuity, discontinuity, and the alteration of theological style (60-61)

    The early orthodox period runs approximately from the Heidelberg Catechism (1565) to when the theologians who sat at the Synod of Dort (1618/19) passed from the seen (ca. 1640). A discernable change of style is evident in this initial period after the Reformation. These theologians are not so much seeking to reform the church but establish and protect it. “The passage of Reformed theology into the era of early orthodoxy can be charted in terms of a movement from basic, discursive instruction to a more sophisticated, dialectical model” (61).

    2. Ground or causes of the rise of scholastic orthodoxy (61-66)

    Muller identifies at least four reasons for the rise and development and rules.

    1) Polemical – the development of a more technical, scholastic style of theological enunciation must be viewed as an accommodation to the needs of debate.

    2) Pedagogical needs (i.e. the concern for method) – the early orthodoxy were concerned with how best to present and articulate (e.g. the emergence of Ramist logic) the theology of the Reformation to their present circumstances in a wide variety of contexts. Note this important sentence: “The early orthodox, whether Ramist or anti-Ramist, share the desire to create a theological system suited to the successful establishment of Protestantism as a church in its own right, catholic in its teaching, capable of being sustained intellectually against its adversaries, and sufficiently technical and methodologically consistent to stand among the other disciplines in the university” (62). This emphasis on method can be illustrated by the distinction between “synthetic” (a deductive approach moving from prolegomena, doctrine of Scripture, doctrine of God, etc) and “analytic” (an inductive approach which may begin with sin and move to redemption and faith, etc) approach to system.

    3) Systematic issues – contra the central dogma folks who argue that P-o was the result of the development of the inner-logic of Protestant doctrine (e.g. predestinarian systematization), Muller sees this period as a process of “self-definition and institutionalization” (i.e. confessionalization).

    4) Philosophical breadth and coherence –in seeking a synthesis between theology and philosophy, P-o looked both to early scholastics (b/t 13th-15th centuries) and to the revived Aristotelianism of Zabarella, Suárez, Keckermann, Alsted, etc. This was done in order to adequately express the Protestant metaphysic in the academy. In other words, P-o adopted scholastic terminology to express their theology.

    3. International dimensions and interrelationships in the rise of Reformed orthodoxy (66-67)

    A keen grasp of the interrelationship and interplay of English and continental theologies is indispensable to an understanding of the post-Reformation period. “A full picture of Reformed orthodoxy cannot afford to omit the English contribution to Protestant scholasticism – nor is it acceptable to attempt to interpret British theology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries without reference to continental developments” (67).

    4. Philosophical issues and developments (67-71)

    Technically, the Ref and p-Ref periods were not philosophical movements; rather, both periods were eclectic in their philosophical perspectives. But we should not equate eclecticism with incoherence. Muller argues that the Reformers and their successors drew from various classical, medieval, and Renaissance ideas and works in order to develop rational arguments that would serve an ancillary (ancilla) position to theology.

    5. Trajectories in Aristotelianism and Rationalism (71-73)

    Although early orthodoxy developed during the emerging ages of science (Kepler, Galileo, Bacon) and rationalism (Descartes, Lord Herbet of Cherbury), these movements did not directly impact P-o until the last half of the 17th century. The development of Christian Aristotelianism in the Protestant universities parallels the development of Protestant scholasticism. Therefore, while Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed theologians may have shared a common foundation (i.e. various forms of Christian Aristotelianism such as Thomism, Scotism, nominalism, etc), they differed over how these medieval schools of thought should be mediated to express their theological formulation.

    What is important to draw from this is to realize the broader intellectual context of the Ref and p-Ref. “Whereas the Reformation is surely the formative even for Protestantism, it is also true that the Reformation, which took place during the first half of the sixteenth century, is the briefer phenomenon, enclosed, as it were by the five-hundred-year history of scholasticism and Christian Aristotelianism.” (73).

    B. Doctrine and Method in the Era of High Orthodoxy (ca. 1640-1685-1725) (73-81)

    1. General Characteristics (73-74)

    Muller divides this period into two halves, as we previously noted (cf. PRRD I.31-32). This period, like early orthodoxy, did not create Reformational doctrine, rather, it developed, elaborated, and clarified the teachings of the Ref (e.g. federal theology, elaboration of exant loci).

    2. Debate and polemic, ad extra and ad intra (74-78)

    By the time of HO, polemics were no longer directed simply against Rome and aspects of Lutheranism. The debates were more complicated in this period.

    1) ad extra debates – largest portion of R-o polemics as these debates posed major threats to the reformed (Catholic, Lutheran, Arminian, Socinian).

    2) ad intra debates – these were discussions and debates within the Reformed (e.g. Cocceian theology, Amyraldianism, soteriology of Baxter, etc).

    3. The breadth of the Reformed orthodox phenomenon (78-81)

    R-o cannot simply be defined in relationship to the Genevan line from Calvin to Turretin; it’s much broader. There is an amazing confessional breadth to R-o (e.g. Swiss orthodox, Academy of Saumer, Cocceian and Voetian federal theology, difference between Owen and Baxter, etc).

    High orthodoxy, then, is the era of the full and final development of Protestant system prior to the great changes in philosophical and scientific perspective that would, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, utterly recast theological system into new forms” (80).

    C. The Problem of Deconfessionalization, “Transitional” Theologies, and the Beginnings of Late Orthodoxy (81-84)

    1. Latitudinarianism and deconfessionalization at the beginnings of late orthodoxy (81-82)

    As the new science and new rationalism begin to hold more sway, from 1685-1725 folks start to get a little leery of traditional dogmatic theology and philosophical assumptions. Some were more enthusiastic about these trends (e.g. J. A. Turretin) than others (e.g. Nadere Reformatie). Muller calls this the “pietistic-eclectic phase” of orthodoxy (i.e. era of latitudinarianism).

    2. Late orthodoxy, Wolffian dogmatics, and the remnants of confessionalism (82-84)

    With the rise of rationalist philosophy and historical-critical exegesis, those who held to the traditional formulations of P-o were few and far between (e.g. Nicholas Gürtler, Bernhardus de Moor, Herman Venema, John Gill, John Brown of Haddington, etc). In Christian Wolff (chair of philosophy in Halle) we find a synthesis of theology to rationalist philosophy. But as Muller notes, “Rationalist philosophy was ultimately incapable of becoming a suitable ancilla and, instead, demanded that it and not theology be considered queen of the sciences. Without a philosophical structure to complement its doctrine and to cohere with its scholastic method, Protestant orthodoxy came to an end” (84).